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A computerized fault tree construction methodology
J D Andrews and J J Henry
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Loughborough University of Technology, Leicestershire
Abstract: A new approach to automating the fault tree construction process is proposed. The meth-
odology has features which make it applicable to binary state systems and also to process control
systems. Previous attempts to model the failure generation in systems have worked well on only a
small sub-class of system types and have failed to produce a generally applicable method. Thus in
some previous approaches there are desirable features which are worth retaining in a new construction
method. The new method is based on the flexibility of the decision table method but incorporates a
way of detecting, classifying and analysing control loops, similar to that used with operators in the
digraph approach. As well as using operators to deal with control loops a new operator is introduced
that deals with two-state circuits. This will mean that when constructing the fault trees, the difficulty
of handling repeated events will be eliminated and the size of the tree structures will be significantly
reduced. The developed algorithm can produce a tree format appropriate for direct input to an
analysis code. The method is demonstrated in this paper by its application to a simplified safety
system from the railway industry. This system has been selected as it exhibits features that are typical
of two-state circuitry but is also small enough to illustrate the new developments introduced.
Keywords: safety, reliability, fault tree analysis
NOTATION results in a tree structured diagram representing how the
component failures, human actions and software errors
contribute to the cause of a specified system failureC current
mode. By providing data for the basic events the treeCONT contacts
can be analysed to yield the minimal cut sets and systemDE de-energized
failure probability or frequency.EN energized
Unfortunately, the development process for fault treesF failed
is a very time intensive activity. Fault trees for theL line
WASH 1400 nuclear reactor study (2) took many manNC no current
years of effort to construct. Once the trees have beenRY relay
developed they can be submitted to one of the manyW working
computer codes which perform the quantitative analysis.
Also, since there are no rigorous rules which, if applied
to a system, guarantee the generation of the correct fault
tree, the quality of trees produced manually is very1 INTRODUCTION
dependent on the experience and abilities of the engineer
who has produced them. These two factors, time andMany different industries are now required to conduct
quality, have been the main driving forces behind therisk assessments of their activities. This involves the
research into ways in which fault tree construction canidentification of potentially hazardous events and an
be implemented on a computer. To date there have beenassessment of their consequences and frequency of
many attempts to develop such a code. The most success-occurrence. Once the risk associated with any activity
ful have been based on digraph approaches (3–5),has been evaluated its acceptability must then be judged.
decision tables (6), expert systems (7) and functionalOne of the most popular approaches to determine the
equations (8–12). Despite the amount of work carriedfrequency of occurrence of hazardous events is provided
out in this area, a commercial package has yet to becomeby fault tree analysis (1). The application of this method
available. Deficiencies are reported in the literature for
these methods (13).The MS was received on 3 June 1996 and was accepted for publication
on 24 June 1997. The majority of work on fault tree synthesis has been
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applied to the control systems for chemical processing to occupy the same section of track at any one time. To
plant. The nature of such plant, and in particular the insure this a train detection system is incorporated on
process control systems, means that it does not facilitate each section, the running rails of each section are electri-
accurate fault tree development. The major difficulties cally isolated from the sections on either side by insu-
arise due to the necessity to model continuous process lation blocks; such a section is illustrated in Fig. 2. When
variables for chemical plant and also electrical circuits the track section is unoccupied electric current flows
which are mainly two-state. around the circuit and energizes the track relay which
This paper explores the possibility of using a hybrid causes a green signal allowing a train to enter this sec-
method derived from two existing methods which would tion. If a train is in the section, the leading wheels and
be appropriate to model two-state and continuously axle, being made of steel provide a short circuit between
variable safety systems. The new approach combines the the tracks. Therefore the relay is de-energized, causing
features of the decision table and digraph methods and the signal to display red until the train has left the sec-
also incorporates some developments new to this tion. If a train attempts to enter an occupied section, the
methodology. ‘train stop’ located at the signal causes the train brakes
It is not possible to describe the full analysis of a to activate. On automatic trains there is equipment to
complex system in this paper, so in order to demonstrate detect whether track circuit current is flowing or not. If
an application of these methods a simple train detection a flow was not detected in the section, the emergency
system from the railway industry has been selected. In brake would be applied.
this way, the main features and their advantages/disad- In the analysis presented here failures of the insulating
vantages can be illustrated. The method is, however, blocks between sections were not taken into consider-
applicable to systems from any industry. ation. This restricted the analysis to enable the major
features of the technique to be demonstrated on a rela-
tively simple example. By restricting the analysis from2 OVERVIEW OF THE FAULT TREE
tracing faults and failures of adjacent sections, it wasCONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
anticipated that the features of the technique would be
clearer. The system shown in Fig. 2 is relevant when
The data flow chart showing the overall approach is there is no train in the section and so the signal is green.
shown in Fig. 1. The system description is entered as a When a train is present in the section the first axle is
schematic diagram [such as a piping and instrumentation represented by the line labelled 3. It is considered here
diagram (P & ID) for process plant] using the facilities that no train present will represent the normal case when
in Auto Cad. From the entered drawing a file is created there will be no current path from line 2 to line 3. If
that holds the topology information for the system. This there is no train and the circuit made there is current to
includes information defining how the components are
the relay which energizes the relay coil, the contacts then
connected together. There is a component decision table
make the connection to the green bulb. G1 and G2 arelibrary that holds all decision tables; any of these
independent power supplies for each circuit.decision tables can be amended or new decision tables
The two failures of concern for this system are:added using the generic component editor. A top event,
the causes of which are to be traced, is entered into the 1. Failure of the red signal when a train is present.
fault tree construction program. The program produces 2. Failure of the green signal when a train is not present.
the fault tree structure which it writes to an output file
that can be read by commercial fault tree analysis pack-
ages. The current version of the software is written for 4 BASIC DECISION TABLE METHOD
compatibility with a specific analysis package, but since
the basic structure of information is common to most
For information on the background of the use ofanalysis codes other interfaces could be created with
decision tables in fault tree construction see referenceminor effort. Using the analysis package, qualitative and
(6). The main advantage of this method is that noquantitative analyses can be performed giving the top
restriction is placed on the number of discrete states usedevent probability or frequency of occurrence. This type
to represent variable deviations. This method requiresof approach using the computer aided design (CAD)
the construction of a tabular model to represent the func-interface would facilitate performance of reliability
tioning/failure of any component. Each componentassessments at the design stage, a practice which is not
input (connection) from other components in the systemwidely performed at present.
is combined with the component state (i.e. working or
a failure mode) to give outputs which are passed on to
3 SYSTEM EXAMPLE other elements of the system. Therefore to perform a
decision table analysis it is necessary to have a model
for each component in the system and a system topologyTo lessen the risk of collision between trains, the track
is divided into sections and two trains are not allowed which links the component input and output ports to
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Fig. 1 Data flow chart
show how the system is constructed. A topology diagram for a component, consider the relay contacts which move
position to light the appropriate signal. First the failurefor the train detection system when a train is present is
shown in Fig. 3. modes of the contact have to be decided upon. It is up
to the analyst how many modes are included in theAs an example of how to construct a decision table
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Fig. 2 Train detection system
Fig. 3 Topology diagram for train detection system
decision table, for this simple example only one failure available failure rate data. Next the influence on the relay
contacts operation is considered to identify the inputs.mode was considered, this being that the contacts fail so
that no connection is made. Other failures which could In this example (see CONT in Fig. 3) there are two
inputs, these being the current supply from line 12 (L12)have been considered are, for example, the contacts
welding in either of the two circuit positions. The choice and the relay (RY ) state which fixes the contact position
selected from the links to the green and red signals. Forof failure modes considered is generally governed by the
E01096 © IMechE 1997Proc Instn Mech Engrs Vol 211 Part E
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Table 1 Decision table for relay contacts placed in the relevant output column. Therefore the ‘—’
occurs because the output state is undetermined by the
IN1 IN2 STATE OUT1 OUT2 input events or will produce a non-minimal set of causes.
The decision tables for the other components have beenC EN W C —
C DE W — C constructed using the same technique.
NC — — NC NC
— DE — NC —
— — F NC NC
— EN W — NC 5 FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION
The method of fault tree construction using decisioneach of the output connections, two variable states,
tables will be illustrated for the top event green lamp offnamely, current (C ) and no current (NC) are of concern.
(GLOFF) for the train detection system when there isA table (Table 1) is constructed which considers all
no train present. First the decision table for the compo-possible combinations of inputs from line 12 in a column
nent whose output contains the top event variable islabelled IN1, inputs from the relay in a column labelled
found. Then the output column of this table is searchedIN2, the system state and the effects that these events
for occurrences of the top event variable in the specifiedwill have on the outputs to the green and red signals
state, in this case OFF. Table 2 presents the signal/bulb(columns labelled OUT1 and OUT2 respectively).
decision table, which contains the top event variable. ForEntries to the table are determined by considering the
the bulb, the entry OFF appears twice in OUT1, theseoutput events. There is only one situation that can cause
are in rows 2 and 3. Since there is more than one causecurrent in output 1 (the green signal connection), which
of this event an OR gate is used at the top event structureis current in line 12 (C IN1), the relay energized (EN
in the fault tree to combine these two possibilities asIN2) and the contacts working (W ). Similarly there is
direct causes of the top event. As row 2 only containsonly one cause of current in output 2, which is current
the failure state of the component, this is added to thein line 12 (C IN1), relay de-energized (DE IN2), and
OR gate as a basic event and the next row is dealt with.contacts working (W ). These conditions are incorpor-
In row 3 there is only one entry in the input and stateated in the first two lines of the contacts decision table
columns (NC IN1), if there were two or more entriesillustrated in Table 1. Turning to causes for no current,
then these would be entered in the fault tree as inputsNC, in output 1, there are three ways in which this result
to an AND gate. Each of these events are then expandedcan occur:
in turn. By examining the system topology diagram1. NC in IN1 will cause NC in OUT1 and OUT2 regard-
(Fig. 3) it can be seen that IN1 for the green bulb (GB)less of the relay state (IN2) or the state of the
connects to the contacts (CONT) OUT1. Therefore, thecomponent.
variable and its value (NC IN1) for the bulb is traced2. The relay (IN2) being de-energized will cause NC in
directly to its cause (NC OUT1) for the contacts. In theOUT1 regardless of IN1 or the component state.
contacts decision table entries for NC in OUT1 are3. If the contacts fail there will be NC in OUT1 or OUT2
sought. Three matches are found (rows 3–5, Table 1).regardless of the input states.
Each of these events is then added to the fault tree giving
The situations are shown in rows 3–5 of the contacts the top event structure shown in Fig. 4. Undeveloped
decision table. events are each expanded in turn until the fault tree is
There are also three ways which produce NC in completed. Any working states incorporated on the fault
output 2, two of these have already been described in tree at this stage are then transformed in terms of failure
cases 1 and 3 above. The remaining case is when the events, i.e. NOT gates containing the component
relay is energized and the contacts work which gives failures.
OUT2 NC regardless of the status of IN1. Incorporating Prior to adding each event from the decision tables to
this combination gives the final decision table for the form the input to a gate, an identifier is attached to the
contacts shown in Table 1. gate as in Fig. 4. The identifier is constructed from the
The ‘—’ in the input and state columns indicates the component name and, depending on how many matches
‘don’t care’ condition, which means that the specified are found in the decision table for the event, either the
input states will result in the specified output event row number or output column number is included. If
regardless of the value of the variable. The final fault
tree needs only to represent the necessary and sufficient
Table 2 Decision table for signal/bulbcauses of an event. When a decision table features more
than a single output event (as in Table 1) then in some
IN1 STATE OUT1 OUT2
circumstances the combination of input events for a table
C W ON Centry will be necessary and sufficient for one output event
— F OFF NCbut not another. To avoid the input conditions being
NC — OFF NC
developed in these cases an ‘unspecified’ state ‘—’ is
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GL OFF
BulbG Row3
Contacts Col0
Contacts Row4
Relay Col1
Contacts row3
Gen2 Col0
Gen2 Row3
Line12 Col0
Relay Row2
Line4 Col0
Line12 Row2
Tcon4 Row3
Line4 Row2
Line2 Col0
Line2 Row2
Line1 Col0
BulbR Col1BulbG Col1
BulbG Row3 BulbR Row3
Contacts Col1 Line1 Row2
Gen1 Col0
Contacts Row3 Contacts Row6
Gen1 Row3
Line9 Col0
Relay Row1
Line9 Row2
Line8 Col0Line1 Row1
Line2 Row1 Line8 Row2
Line7 Col0
Line1 Row1
Line7 Row2
Line6 Col0
Gen1 Row1
Line6 Row2
Relay Col0Line9 Row1
Line8 Row1 Relay Row2
Line7 Row1
Line6 Row1
Relay Row1
OR
OR
OR OR
OR OR
OR
OR OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
GBF
CSF
GR2F RYF
LE12F LE4F
LE2F
AND
AND
OR
RBF
LE1F
BGF
CSF
GR1F
OR
AND
AND
AND
AND
AND
AND
AND
AND
AND
NOT
CSF
NOT
RYF
NOT
LEF4
NOT
LE2F
NOT
LE1F
NOT
GR1F
NOT
LE9F
NOT
LE8F
NOT
LE7F
NOT
LE6F
OR
LE6F
LE7F
RYF
LE8F
LE9F
OR
Fig. 4 Fault tree for green bulb off constructed using decision table method
there is more than one match in the decision table then 5.1 The identification of repeated and inconsistent
the output column number is used, otherwise the row events
number will be used. This identifier is used to check for
Before a gate is added to a branch of the tree, the newinconsistent and repeated events. A repeated event
identifier is compared character by character with all theoccurs in the fault tree when the system being tackled
other identifiers above it on that branch. If there is acontains circuits. Inconsistent events are those which
complete match then this is a repeated event, no vari-cannot cause the events appearing at higher levels in the
tree structure. ables need to be tested. If there is a match apart from
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Table 3 Decision table for the relay where the termination has taken place is expanded,
again the gate is not deleted.
IN1 STATE OUT1 OUT2 3. An inconsistent event which is input to an OR gate
is dealt with in exactly the same manner as that forC W C EN
NC — NC DE a repeated event.
— F NC DE
The tree structures produced by this method are very
large and contain too many unnecessary branches. A
modification to the method that yields more concise treethe last number, which indicates the row of the relevant
structures and hence lessens the amount of time spentdecision table, then there may be a repeated or an incon-
checking for repeated and inconsistent events would besistent event depending on the variable inputs in each of
of real benefit. This efficiency can be gained by utilizingthe rows. For this case the method used for identification
a structure similar to the type of operator found in thewill be described with reference to an example. The iden-
digraph technique.tifiers that include the output column number are not
checked for matches as repeated or inconsistent events
will be detected when this is expressed in terms of its
6 MODIFIED DECISION TABLE APPROACHrows later in the tree.
Consider the two identifiers RELAY ROW 1 and
RELAY ROW 2. The decision table for the relay is The main weakness in the decision table method in its
shown in Table 3. The relay has two outputs in the original form is its inability to detect, classify and analyse
system, the first is to line 6 (L6) and the second to the control loops and circuits. Therefore modifications have
contacts (CONT). In the first instance consider output been made to the basic method to consider these situ-
for both identifiers coming from line 6, i.e. the first ations. The decision tables are modified to incorporate
output column, then the entries in output column 1 are a gain which indicates how deviations in the input vari-
current (C) and no current (NC) for each of the rows able affect the output state. This gain is rather like that
respectively. As no one branch of a fault tree can contain used with the directed edges in the digraph method. The
the same component twice with mutually exclusive vari- gain takes a sign value which is + or − depending on
able states, in this case C and NC, these two events are the relationship between the input and output variables.
inconsistent events. On the other hand, if the output for If, for example, an increase in an input variable causes
the second identifier came from the contacts, then the an increase in the output variable then the associated
output variables cannot be compared as they are to gain would be positive since there is a direct relationship
different components. In this case the input variables to between these variables. On the other hand, if an increase
the rows need to be compared as these will be the next in an input variable causes a reduction in an output
variables that are expanded in the tree. Only input col- variable then the gain would be negative, i.e. an indirect
umns that do not contain any ‘don’t care’ states are relationship. The other main change to the format of the
compared and the state column is ignored. So in this decision tables is the inclusion of an EXCLUSIVE state
case the only variables to be compared are from input row. This row is incorporated in the decision table so
column 1, namely current (C) and no current (NC); that mutually exclusive component states are identified
therefore, as before, this event would be an inconsistent and hence inconsistent events can be reduced from the
event. If the variables had matched then there would tree using Boolean algebra. This row is added at the
have been a repeated event. bottom of the decision table to show all the states in
which the component can reside. The first entry in the
EXCLUSIVE row is the working state of the compo-
nent, all subsequent entries are the possible failure states.5.2 Rules for dealing with repeated and inconsistent
This information is used in fault trees which containevents
basic events representing the component in its working
state. The fault tree should contain only failure events1. For a repeated event the branch of the tree where the
second occurrence of the event appears is terminated and so the component working state is replaced by NOT
any of its failed states. The keyword EXCLUSIVEand the next input event of the gate is expanded. The
gate whose input event development was terminated appears in the table to identify the occurrence of this
row, see Table 4. In the new decision tables an identifieris not detected even if it now contains only one input.
2. For an inconsistent event which is an input to an is also included that indicates if the component is a
power supply. This takes the form of a P after the 3AND gate, the branch of the tree is traversed upwards
until an OR gate or the identifier which made the numbers in row 3 of the decision tables. For example if
the decision table in Table 4 was a power supply thematch is encountered (since any AND gate output
event cannot now occur). Then the branch is termin- format of row 3 would become 2, 2, 1, P.
The new decision table format for the contacts isated at this point and the next input event of the gate
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Table 4 Modified decision table format number, input column number and variable state being
traced are also included. Construction starts with the
CONTACTS top event component so the initial component to con-NORMAL
sider is the red lamp/bulb. From its decision table2,2,1
+,+,+,+ (Table 2), it can be seen that the top event variable
IN1, IN2, STATE, OUT1, OUT2 occurs in output column 1. From the table the causes ofC, EN, W, C,-
this output OUT1=OFF) coded as 01=NL in Fig. 5D, DE, W, -, C
NC, -, -, NC, NC are given by two rows, the bulb fails (row 3, Table 2) or
-, DE, -, NC, - there is no current in input column 1 (row 2, Table 2);-, -, F, NC, NC
the state column of the decision tables is of no interest-, EN, W, -, NC
EXCLUSIVE in the graph construction since it does not trace faults
W, F back through the system and so the first of these events
is ignored and only the second is traced. The red bulb
connects to output column 2 of the contacts (systemshown in Table 4. The row containing NORMAL is used
topology diagram) and the method is applied again.to provide a component identifier for situations when
Each of the branches of the graph are terminated nat-there is more than one component of the same type. For
urally at the system boundary or when the new compo-example there might be two different types of valve in
nent being added to the branch is a match with athe system then a unique identifier for each of the valves
component which appears further up on the samewould be entered in this row. In the third row of Table 4
branch. In this case the causes of an event have beenthe three numbers correspond to the number of inputs
traced in a loop back to itself and the fault developmentin the table, the number of outputs in the table and the
is terminated. The completed topology graph for ‘rednumber of tables. There may be more than one table for
bulb off when there is a train in the section’ is shownthe different variables, e.g. in a valve there may be one
in Fig. 5.to model temperature deviations and one to model
Consider the termination of the branches labelled 3flowrate deviations. For the contacts there are 2 inputs,
and 5 in Fig. 5. The last component added to the2 outputs and only one table which traces the variable
branches is L4 01 (output column 1). When thesecurrent. The fourth row is the gain row where the
branches are traversed upwards towards the top eventrelationship between each of the input and output vari-
they both encounter the same event which is L4 01. Asables is stored. The order of the stored gains is such that
the component name and output column match, the twoeach input is dealt with in turn and its relationship with
branches are terminated. Other branches are terminatedeach of the outputs is added to the row of gains.
for similar reasons.
From the topology graph all the possible loops and
circuits can be identified. The gains relating input and6.1 Loop/circuit identification
output events for the components in the potential loops
are used for the loop/circuit identification and classifi-Before the tree is constructed using the modified decision
table method all of the loops and circuits in the system cation. As a NFB (negative feedback) loop and an elec-
trical circuit have exactly the same characteristics on aneed to be identified, these are identified by using the
topology of the system. This will be demonstrated again topology graph apart from the sign of the total gain for
the loop (as described below), only two loop detectionusing the train detection system example.
The first step in the construction of the fault tree for algorithms need to be introduced, one for NFF (negative
feedforward) loops and the second for NFB loops. Thethe train detection system for the top event ‘red signal
off when there is a train in the section’ is to build up the algorithm for the detection of the NFB loops is the sim-
plest as it only involves scanning one branch at a time.topology graph of the system. This is achieved by using
the decision tables together with the topology diagram
(Fig. 3) to link each of the system components as the
variable states are traced from the top event back 6.2 Negative feedback loop/circuit detection
through the system. A topology graph is a directed graph
consisting of nodes and edges. The nodes represent The characteristic of the NFB loop is that it has the
ability to correct moderate disturbances in the sensedspecific values of the output variables for the component
identified. The edges link the nodes such that those nodes variable. To identify a NFB loop from the topology
graph a path must exist that starts and ends with thedirectly below any other nodes contribute to their cause.
The topology graph unlike a fault tree does not, how- same variable with a resulting negative product of the
gains. If there is a path starting and ending at the sameever, indicate how these events need to combine. A node
on a topology graph represents an input event from a variable with a positive overall gain it identifies either a
positive feedback loop (which does not need specialrow of a decision table. As each new node is added to
the graph, the component identifier, output column treatment since it will be detected on a system start-up)
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Fig. 5 Topology graph for red bulb off
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or a circuit. A circuit requires other conditions such as loop can, in theory, prevent the disturbance progressing
through the system. This is achieved by sensing anpower supply to be contained on the loop. For the identi-
fication process each of the branches of the topology upstream variable and manipulating a downstream vari-
able. A NFF control loop features two paths in thetree is dealt with, one at a time. Each node on the branch
is compared with every other node above it on the system structure, a causative path and a corrective path.
These features are identified on a topology graph bybranch for a match. To obtain a match three criteria
must be met: paths which progress upward from a common node
which occurs on two or more branches and the upward(a) the component type and numbers must match;
paths converge at a second node. In other words there(b) the output column number must match; and
need to be two or more paths between two components(c) the output variable must match.
in the system.
In this example, it can be seen from Fig. 5 that the The rules for the method of detection are:
first match appears on branch 1 with the components
1. Only deal with branches that have a common endgenerator 2, output column 1 and variable NC. So the
node.path of the first potential NFB loop or circuit is
2. For two branches with a common end node traverseGEN2CONTGBT4L12GEN2 (i.e. genera-
up the topology graph to locate the second commontor 2contactsgreen bulbT-connectorline 12
node where the branches meet.generator 2). Once all the branches have been traversed
3. The resultant gains on each path of the branches arein this way the resulting loops need to be compared
then evaluated. If the resultant gains are of a differentagainst each other for duplicates. If two loops contain
sign then the loop is a NFF loop, otherwise the loopthe same components but in one loop current is being
can be discarded.traced and in the other no current is traced, then these
loops are treated as completely separate loops and are
both retained in the list. If any duplicates are found these
7 FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTIONrepetitions can be discarded. In this example there are a
possible six NFB loops or circuits.
When control loops or circuits are encountered during
1 cont(02)bulbR(02)t4(01)line12(01) fault tree construction ‘operators’ are utilized which
gen2(01) develop causes of the failure events being traced by con-
2 gen2(01)cont(01)bulbG(01)t4(01) sidering the failure of the loop or circuit as a single entity.
line12(01) The fault tree is constructed in the usual manner, but
3,4 line4(01)relay(01)line6(01)line7(01) as each new component is encountered in the tree pro-
axle(02)line8(01)line9(01)gen1(01) duction a check is made as described in Section 5 to see
line1(01)line2(01)axle(01) whether the component lies on a circuit, NFF loop or
5,6 line2(01)axle(02)line8(01)line9(01) NFB loop. If the component lies on a NFF loop or a
gen1(01)line1(01) NFB loop, the operators developed by Lambert (14) are
The state of the variable that is traced round each applied. If the component lies on a circuit, the new circuit
circuit is as follows: operator is applied.
(1) No current (2) No current (3) Current
(4) No current (5) Current (6) No current
7.1 Circuit operators
Once all of the possible NFB loops have been detected
There at two circuit operators. The first is applicablethese loops have to be classified as either NFB or circuits.
when the no current situation is traced around the cir-This is where the gain contained in the modified decision
cuit. This first operator is illustrated in Fig. 6 and cantables is used. If loop 1 above is considered, the relation-
be summarized as follows:ships between the appropriate inputs and outputs for all
the components on the loop are extracted from the 1. A failure of any component in the circuit will cause
appropriate decision tables. In this case they are all posi- the open circuit condition with no current. Therefore,
tive. So when the product of the gains is taken, the result- deal with all components in turn adding their relevant
ant gain is also positive. This, together with the fact that failure states to an OR gate (right-hand branch).
the loop contains a power source (gen2), indicates that 2. When each component is being dealt with, the
the path between the common components is a circuit. decision tables are checked to see if there are any
external inputs to the circuit at that component. Any
entries of NC in the input that traces the path around6.3 NFF loop detection
the circuit can be ignored as this just represents the
circuit continuity. If there are, then these externalWhereas feedback loops correct disturbances which cur-
rently exist in the system, a NFF (negative feedforward) inputs must be examined. If the external input is any
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NC in circuit
n possible
inputs
Development of each
component on the circuit
All combinations of events
which give NC in circuit output col
which also have NC in circuit input col
(NC in circuit input col is ignored as it
represents circuit continuity)
All combinations of events which
give NC in circuit output col which
do not have NC in circuit input col 
Expand row entries checking that
any external events are not inconsistent
Expand row entries checking that
any external events are not inconsistent
Fig. 6 NC in circuit operator
state of the variable current then this external is incon- From the topology graph in Fig. 5 and the decision
tables for the components there are six circuits. Initiallysistent and can be ignored. Otherwise the external
the tree is developed in the normal manner as shown ininput is expanded using the decision tables as with
Fig. 8 until the identifier BULBrow3 is added. The onlyany other variable state in the fault tree ( left-hand
input to row3 is NC, the topology graph shows that thisbranch).
input is connected to OUT2 of the contacts. So the next
When current flowing in a circuit is traced then for this component to be dealt with is Cont(02) NC. The six
condition all the components in the circuit must be circuits are searched for this combination and a match
working, so an AND gate appears in the operator, as is found in circuit 1. As this is the first circuit the only
shown in Fig. 7. check that needs to be made is if the circuit contains a
To demonstrate the use of the circuit operator it is power source, which it has in component gen2. A note
necessary to consider the construction of the fault tree is made of the entry component to the circuit for consist-
ency checks later, in this case it is the contacts. Thefor the train detection system with top event RBOFF.
C in circuit
n possible
inputs
Development of each
component on the circuit
All combinations of events
which give C in circuit output col
which also have C in circuit input col
(C in circuit input col is ignored as it
represents circuit continuity)
All combinations of events which
give C in circuit output col which
do not have C in circuit input col 
Expand row entries checking that
any external events are not inconsistent
Expand row entries checking that
any external events are not inconsistent
Fig. 7 C in circuit operator
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Fig. 8 Fault tree for top event red bulb off
circuit operator for NC is now applied, so an OR gate occurring with the T-connector, for which a match is
found in circuit 2 for T4(OUT1)NC. The decision tableG2 is added, then each component on the circuit is dealt
with in turn. The decision table for the contacts, Table 4, for the T-connector is shown in Table 5.
For consistency, the second circuit on which theis viewed for causes of NC in output 2, there are three
matches in the output column and these occur in rows T-connector is located has to contain the input compo-
nent on the loop being traced with the traced condition3, 5 and 6: (a) NC,-,-; (b) -,-,F; or (c) -,EN,-. The inputs
from any of the components on the circuit can be deleted matching the correct output column and also a power
supply. Without these conditions it cannot affect thefrom the three matched rows as these just trace the path
of the circuit. In this case the first input column is from fault conditions being traced. It can be seen from cir-
cuit 2 that it does contain a power supply, gen2, butL12 and the second from the relay, therefore since L12
is part of the circuit all inputs in column 1 can be ignored does not contain the component with the correct output
column, i.e. Cont(02)NC. Therefore, no entries are( left-hand branch of operator), which just leaves rows 5
and 6 to consider. As there are still two rows, an OR incorporated on the fault tree for this component.
When the application of the circuit operator has beengate, G3, is added to G2 of the fault tree and these rows
are expanded in turn. Row 5 of the contacts decision completed the stored external input to G3 is expanded.
In this case the variable in input 2 of the contacts is EN.table contains only the component in its failure mode,
therefore the failure (CSF) is added to G3, see Fig. 8. This is connected to the relay output column 2. As this
variable and output column do not appear on any ofAny inputs that are not from the circuit are described
as external inputs, in this case the input in row 6 is from the circuits the fault tree is constructed in the normal
manner. Output column 2 of the decision table for thethe relay which is not on the circuit. When an external
input is encountered the component name, output relay is searched for the variable state EN, only one
match is found which is in row 1 of the table, the inputscolumn and variable are checked against all the inputs
in the circuits, to see if it lies on one of the other circuits. to row 1 are C (current) and W (working). As there are
two inputs, an AND gate (G4), is added to the OR gateIn this case relay 02 EN does not lie on any of the six
circuits, therefore this event will be further expanded by G3 containing the input CSF. A NOT gate is then devel-
oped from G4 to deal with the working state of the relay.the normal fault tree techniques later. The next compo-
nent on the circuit is BulbR(02), the component is dealt The working state is converted to NOT failed states since
with in the same manner as for the contacts. From the
decision table for the bulb there are two matches in
Table 5 Decision table for T-connectorOUT2 for the variable NC, the matches occur in rows
2 and 3. As the bulb only has one input, this is the input
IN1 IN2 STATE OUT1
that traces the path round the circuit and, as before, can
C — W Cbe ignored, leaving only the failure of the red bulb
— C W C(RBF ) to be added to G2. All of the other components
NC NC — NC
on the circuit are dealt with similarly, the only difference
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